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TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-CORPORATION HELD NOT COLLAPSIBLE
WHERE Vmw To SELL AROSE AFTER CONSTRUCTION COMPLETED-Petitioners
had formed a corporation for the purpose of building and operating a
housing project. After the construction was completed and most of the
apartments rented, small cracks were discovered in the buildings. Without
soliciting engineering or other technical opinion, petitioners sold their
stock in the corporation. The Tax Court1 upheld respondent-commissioner's taxing the profit from the sale of stock as ordinary income rather
than capital gain, on the theory that the corporation was "collapsible" under section 117 (m) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.2 On appeal, held,
reversed. Since the view to the sale of stock did not exist before construction
was completed, the corporation was not within the contemplation of section
117 (m). Jacobson v. Comm'r, 281 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 1960).
Section 117 (m), now section 341 of the 1954 Code, provides that gains
from the sale of stock of a collapsible corporation be taxed as ordinary income. It defines a collapsible corporation as one "formed or availed of
principally for the manufacture, construction, or production of property ...
with a view to •.. the sale of stock by its shareholders ... prior to a realization by the corporation . . . of a substantial part of the net income to
be derived from such property. . . ."3 The cases and Treasury regulations

Lewis S. Jacobson, 32 T.C. 893 (1959).
Rev. Code of 1939, § 117 (m), added by ch. 994, § 212, 64 Stat. 934 (1950) (now
INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 341).
3 (Emphasis added.) Ibid. See also Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117 (m}(3) (C) (now
essentially INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 341 (d) (3)): "this subsection shall not apply to gain
realized after the expiration of three years following the completion of such manufacture,
construction, or production."
1

2 Int.
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construing the section 117 (m) "view" requirement agree that a corporation
can be collapsible even though the view to the sale of stock was not the sole
or principal reason for which the corporation was "formed or availed of," 4
and have been concerned primarily with the time when the view to sell
must have arisen or existed. It must initially be recognized that in fact
there must necessarily exist, if only immediately prior to the actual sale, a
view to sell in every case where stock has been sold. The question would
then be whether application of section 117 (m) requires more than such a
belated "view."11
In the principal case, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held
that section 117 (m) requires for collapsibility the temp0ral conjunction of
construction, which is one of the named corporate purposes of section
117 (m), and the view to the sale of stock. The Court looked primarily to
the language of section 117 (m) and reasoned that the view with which the
property was constructed must necessarily be a view held at the time of the
construction. This interpretation appears to be reasonable in light of the
statutory language and finds support in the Treasury regulations, which
say that a corporation should not be deemed collapsible if the sale of stock
is attributable solely to circumstances not reasonably foreseeable before
construction was completed.6 On the other hand, the Courts of Appeals
for the Second and Fourth Circuits, in Glickman v. Comm'rt and Burge
v. Comm'r,s respectively, use what is essentially an objective test.9 They
have held that a corporation can be classified as collapsible if the view to
the sale of stock existed at any time during the life of the corporation.10
This result is achieved by the somewhat strained reasoning that a corpora4 See Weil v. Comm'r, 252 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1958); Burge v. Comm'r, 253 F.2d 765
(4th Cir. 1958) (dictum); Glickman v. Comm'r, 256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958) (dictum); R. A.
Bryan, 32 T.C. 104 (1959) (dictum); Treas. Reg. Ill, § 29.II7-II (b) (1953). It has also been
argued that had Congress intended that the view to sell be a principal objective, it would
have used the phrase with "the" view rather than with "a" view. MacLean, Collapsible
Corporations, 67 HARV. L. REv. 55, 58-60 (1953).
Ii "Section 341 [of INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954-which was formerly § II7 (m) of Int. Rev.
Code of 1939] is a patchwork of interlaced problems of interpretation. For recurring obscurities of meaning it is hard to surpass. Neither well conceived nor well drafted, it is
replete with vague concepts and obscure or faulty phraseology." DeWind & Anthoine,
Collapsible Corporations, 56 CoLUM. L. REv. 475, 534 (1956).
6 Treas. Reg. Ill, § 29.II7-ll (b) (1953). Emphasis must be placed on "solely" for the
Treasury regulations observe that the view can exist during construction if there was then
recognized even a conditional possibility of sale. This has been criticized as giving the
"view" an unreasonably weak meaning. See MacLean, supra note 4, at 60.
7 256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958).
B 253 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1958).
9 The objective test is whether when the stock was sold, the corporation held recently
constructed property. This reasoning ignores the subjective criterion which distinguishes
between bona fide short-lived corporations and sham corporations.
10 All of these cases involve essentially the same fact situation: taxpayers form a closelyheld corporation, get an FHA loan, and build an apartment house, or housing project.
Afte: construction is completed, but before a "substantial part" of the rental moneys are
rec~1ved: !3"P~yers sell the stock, or liquidate the corporation, realizing a large profit on
their or1gmal mvestments. Thus there does not appear to be any factual basis for reconciling the conflict among the circuits.
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tion is collapsible if it is "availed of" for the proscribed sale of stock.11 In
effect these courts read into section 117 (m) the proscribed sale of stock as
one of the purposes for which a corporation may be availed of under section
117 (m).12 Thus they accept the most belated view possible as satisfying
section 117 (m) and negate any significance which Congress might have intended to attach to the "view'' requirement. The courts in Burge and
Glickman were persuaded to this interpretation by considerations of the
problems which led Congress to enact section 117 (m).13 Subsection (m) was
added to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 in 195014 to prevent the formation or use of short-lived corporations in isolated ventures for the purpose
of lessening tax liability by converting what was essentially ordinary income
into long-term capital gain.15 From these problems, the courts in Burge and
Glickman have drawn their inference that Congress intended to preclude
the enjoyment of capital treatment by means of any short-lived corporation
which engaged in any of section 117 (m)'s enumerated activities.1 6 In each
of the pre-enactment cases confronting Congress, the taxpayers admittedly
sought from the outset to avoid ordinary treatment; accordingly the competing inference could reasonably be drawn that Congress intended section
117 (m) to apply only to those whose formation or use of corporations was
influenced by "a view to the sale of stock." Since this more restrictive interpretation of the pre-enactment materials is reasonable and is consonant
with the language of the statute, reference to these pre-enactment materials
does not dissolve the ambiguity found in the statute by the courts in Burge
and Glickman.
The rule laid down by Burge and Glickman does have the effect of
plugging what those courts would otherwise have considered a loophole.
11E.g., Glickman v. Comm'r, supra note 4, at 111: "Since the corporation may at any
time during its corporate life be 'availed of' for the proscribed purpose, •.• it seems surprising that the Regulations have adopted a narrower interpretation of the statute, and
require the requisite view to exist 'during the construction •• .' or to be 'attributable' to
'circumstances which reasonably could be anticipated by the time of such ••. construction.'
We are disposed to disagree with so narrow an interpretation .•• .'' There is little, if any,
justification for omitting the words "manufacture, construction, or production" as modifiers
of "formed or availed of.'' "How can one 'construct property with a view to a distribution'
if the 'view' arose after the property was constructed? If the draftsmen truly intended to
apply section 341 based on the taxpayer's intentions on the sale or liquidation date, they
could easily have said so." Comment, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 855, 865 (1960).
12 See, e.g., Burge v. Comm'r, supra note 4, at 768.
13 Such ambiguity as there is in this part of the statute seems hardly great enough to
warrant reference to pre-enactment materials.
14 Added by ch. 994, § 212, 64 Stat. 906 (1950).
15 In the movie and construction industries, the practice had arisen of forming a corporation to make a movie or build a building; the actors and directors, or the contractors,
would take stock instead of salaries. When the production or construction was completed,
the stock in the corporation would be sold before box office or rental moneys were received.
The profit was thus taxable as capital gain rather than ordinary income. For further discussion, see STANLEY &: K!LcULLEN, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (Supp. 1950, at 24-25); DeWind &: Anthoine, supra note 5.
16 See Burge v. Comm'r, supra note 4, at 769; Glickman v. Comm'r, supra note 4, at 110.
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While the decision in the principal case closes only a smaller loophole, it
is probably the one which Congress sought to close. In fathoming congressional intent, the whole difficulty stems from the question of whether
to hinge capital treatment on the motive or on the consequences of the
taxpayer's acts. The Burge-Glickman rule, while it does not thwart at least
the original reason for limiting tax on capital gains,1 7 does disregard what
seems to be a congressional determination that the taxpayer's motive is an
essential consideration in determining collapsibility. Therefore, although
the Burge-Glickman rule is easier to administer, since it does not require
judicial inquiry into the existence of a subjective factor, it is a less reasonable conclusion to draw. The rule in the principal case is the more justifiable interpretation, recognizing as it does the requirement of subjective
intent which has been written into the statute. It is to be presumed that
Congress did not require a "view" without intending some significance.

Amalya L. Kearse
17The limitation of taxation on income defined as capital gains was originally enacted,
in part, because such income may have accrued over a period of several years and it would
be "inequitable to tax [it] ••• at progressive rates in the particular year in which [it is]
•.• realized." MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME 115 (rev. ed. 1945). However, the possibility of
this unfairness is much diminished in the case of a corporation collapsible by either interpretation of the statute, since the gains will probably have accrued in less than three
years. See note 3 supra.

